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Borys Ulanenko
CEO of ArmsLength AI

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A QDMTT (Qualified Domestic Minimum Top-up Tax) is a Pillar Two-aligned domestic top-up tax designed to be functionally equivalent to the OECD GloBE rules and to collect the incremental tax up to 15% in the source (host) jurisdiction. In the GloBE computation, the QDMTT payable reduces the jurisdictional top-up tax through the Article 5.2.3 Jurisdictional Top-up Tax formula (which subtracts “Domestic Top-up Tax,” defined as the amount payable under a QDMTT for the year). If the domestic regime is not treated as a QDMTT, an MNE can face either (i) residual foreign top-up tax (IIR/UTPR) and/or (ii) duplicative complexity, depending on whether and how the domestic minimum tax is treated under the Covered Taxes rules.
A Qualified Domestic Minimum Top-up Tax (QDMTT) is the “host country version” of Pillar Two: a domestic tax that aims to replicate the GloBE jurisdictional ETR mechanics and charge a top-up when the jurisdiction’s effective tax rate is below 15%.
QDMTTs are largely about taxing rights and cash tax location:
This is why, in practice, QDMTTs often change the question from “Will there be a Pillar Two top-up tax?” to “Where will the top-up tax be paid—locally, at the parent, or via UTPR allocations?”
QDMTT is a Pillar Two concept. If you need a full grounding in the broader architecture (GloBE income, covered taxes, SBIE, IIR, UTPR, GIR), start with our hub: /blog/pillar-two-guide and /blog/global-minimum-tax-guide. For definitions, see /glossary/pillar-two and /glossary/qdmtt.
Practitioners often describe QDMTT as having “priority.” Technically, the “priority” is achieved through the ordering embedded in the GloBE computation, not through a standalone priority clause.
At a high level:
The OECD guidance distinguishes between amounts that exist in a statute and amounts that are actually payable for the year. In practice, regimes and fact patterns can produce an amount that is:
As a practical rule of thumb: “payable” often follows the year’s accrual/assessment mechanics, but OECD guidance flags that amounts that are subject to challenge or deemed not assessable/collectible can be treated as not payable for these purposes (see OECD July 2023 guidance’s discussion linking safe harbour eligibility to “QDMTT payable” under Art. 5.2.3).
If a QDMTT amount is materially uncertain (e.g., under formal dispute or not assessable/collectible), you can end up with a “gap year” where the group cannot fully rely on the domestic reduction or safe harbour—creating residual IIR/UTPR exposure until the domestic position stabilizes.
Even if the domestic system collects more than the GloBE-computed top-up tax, the GloBE mechanics do not create a negative jurisdictional top-up tax or a refund through the GloBE system (OECD Consolidated Commentary (2025), treatment of Domestic Top-up Tax mechanics and the floor at zero).
Not every domestic minimum tax is a QDMTT. The OECD frames qualification as functional equivalence (OECD Feb 2023 Agreed Administrative Guidance).
A domestic regime is generally expected to be “qualified” when:
In other words, “qualified” is not about copying the GloBE text line-by-line—it’s about reliably producing a GloBE-consistent result for in-scope MNEs.
In addition to architecture + outcomes, the OECD’s definition-level guidance highlights another high-level constraint: a QDMTT must be implemented and administered consistently with GloBE provided that the jurisdiction does not provide any benefits that are related to the GloBE Rules (OECD Feb 2023 Agreed Administrative Guidance, QDMTT definition commentary).
This matters in practice because it pushes jurisdictions away from designs that “give back” QDMTT through direct or indirect relief linked to the minimum-tax computation.
A QDMTT must, at minimum, operate correctly for in-scope groups (typically consolidated revenue ≥ €750m in at least 2 of the prior 4 years, under the GloBE scope framework). OECD guidance also contemplates that jurisdictions may choose to apply a domestic top-up tax more broadly (e.g., to smaller groups) without breaking qualification—provided the regime still functions appropriately for in-scope MNEs (OECD Feb 2023 Agreed Administrative Guidance).
Many jurisdictions had minimum taxes before Pillar Two (or are introducing “minimum tax” concepts that are not GloBE-aligned). Those taxes can be valuable domestically, but they can fail the QDMTT test.
| Feature | QDMTT (Qualified Domestic Minimum Top-up Tax) | Typical non-qualified domestic minimum tax |
|---|---|---|
| Blending level | Jurisdictional (tracks GloBE approach) | Often entity-level or based on local tax groupings |
| Income base | GloBE-like (financial accounting base + GloBE adjustments) | Often local taxable income or bespoke accounting profit base |
| Goal | Bring ETR to 15% in a GloBE-consistent way | Ensure a minimum local tax take (not necessarily aligned to GloBE) |
| Interaction with IIR/UTPR | Reduces jurisdictional top-up tax via the Art. 5.2.3 Domestic Top-up Tax subtraction (often eliminating residual top-up) | May not reduce jurisdictional top-up tax as “Domestic Top-up Tax”; may still leave residual top-up (and can create multi-layer outcomes in narrow cases) |
| Qualification risk | Assessed against functional equivalence + “no related benefits” constraint (OECD Feb 2023 Guidance) | Higher risk of failing functional equivalence |
Model carefully: under the OECD Model Rules, QDMTT itself is excluded from Covered Taxes, but other domestic taxes (even “minimum taxes”) may still be Covered Taxes if they meet the Article 4.2 definition. Don’t conflate “not a QDMTT” with “doesn’t affect the GloBE ETR.”
When reviewing a jurisdiction’s “minimum tax,” ask one operational question first: “Will it be treated as a QDMTT payable in the GloBE computation?” If the answer is unclear, model both (i) the Art. 5.2.3 Domestic Top-up Tax subtraction case and (ii) the “Covered Taxes only” case.
The QDMTT safe harbour is intended to reduce duplicated work. If the safe harbour applies, the MNE can treat the jurisdiction’s GloBE top-up tax as deemed zero (OECD July 2023 Administrative Guidance).
Critically, the OECD July 2023 guidance describes the QDMTT Safe Harbour as an election made by the Filing Constituent Entity (not an automatic switch).
OECD July 2023 Administrative Guidance outlines safe harbour standards that, in practice, are usually summarized as:
| Standard | What it aims to ensure | Practical implication for MNEs |
|---|---|---|
| Accounting standard | QDMTT uses appropriate accounting basis aligned with GloBE objectives | Data model should start from the UPE consolidation standard where feasible |
| Consistency standard | QDMTT computation is consistent with GloBE outcomes | Watch for local deviations (credits, incentives, carryforwards) that distort outcomes |
| Administration standard | Compliance and administration are robust and transparent | Track filing, payment, audit and dispute mechanics; “payable” is critical |
Safe harbour eligibility is not the same as “the country has a QDMTT statute.” It depends on whether the regime meets the safe harbour standards and whether the group can validly elect the safe harbour. Under OECD July 2023 guidance, you generally cannot elect the QDMTT Safe Harbour if the QDMTT liability is subject to challenge or deemed not assessable such that it would not be treated as “QDMTT payable” under Art. 5.2.3.
Without the safe harbour, many groups end up effectively doing two computations for the same jurisdiction:
With the safe harbour, you still do (1), but (2) can often be simplified for that jurisdiction (subject to each implementing jurisdiction’s mechanics and the OECD guidance framework).
A single “official global list” is not embedded in the OECD Model Rules. However, there is now an OECD-maintained reference point for transitional qualified status outcomes.
The OECD publishes a Central Record of Legislation with Transitional Qualified Status, including a table for “Qualified Domestic Minimum Top-up Tax Rules and QDMTT Safe Harbours.” The OECD page notes the central record is current as at 18 August 2025 and is updated periodically after jurisdictions complete the transitional qualification mechanism process.
Two practical takeaways:
Because “status” has multiple layers, a practical hierarchy is:
For practical purposes, many practitioners also reference the UK HMRC manual list of qualifying domestic top-up taxes and effective dates (noting HMRC is a UK recognition list, and “effective” dates are typically expressed as applicable for fiscal years beginning on/after the listed date).
Based on HMRC’s running list (accessed Dec 2025):
| Effective date (as listed by HMRC) | Examples of jurisdictions with QDMTTs |
|---|---|
| 31 Dec 2023 | Many EU Member States, UK, Canada |
| 1 Jan 2024 | Australia, Norway, Switzerland, South Africa, others |
| 1 Jan 2025 | UAE, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brazil, others |
| Future noted | Japan (1 Apr 2026) |
HMRC’s page maintains separate lists for (i) “Pillar Two territories” and (ii) “qualifying domestic top-up taxes (QDMTTs).” That distinction matters: for example, a jurisdiction can be listed as having a QDMTT effective from one date while its broader Pillar Two territory status (e.g., IIR) has a different effective date.
For EU groups, QDMTT implementation is shaped by the Minimum Tax Directive (Council Directive (EU) 2022/2523), which explicitly permits a qualified domestic top-up tax option and aligns member state frameworks.
These terms are often conflated:
Practically, your risk assessment should track all three dimensions—especially in year 1–2 of adoption in each jurisdiction.
QDMTT is not just another filing. It changes where incremental tax is paid and therefore affects treasury, forecasting, transfer pricing operating models, and incentive strategy.
Under IIR-only structures, low-taxed profits often generate top-up tax at the parent. With QDMTT, the same incremental tax can be collected locally.
This can affect:
Many traditional incentives reduce local tax below 15% (holidays, free zones, preferential IP regimes). Under QDMTT, the benefit can be partially or fully offset by domestic top-up tax to reach the 15% minimum.
In some cases, jurisdictions respond by pivoting toward:
The key point for practitioners: re-evaluate incentives using GloBE/QDMTT economics, not purely local ETR optics (OECD Feb 2023 Admin Guidance discusses the importance of outcomes not being systematically lower).
It’s true that a domestic minimum tax that is not treated as QDMTT can leave residual IIR/UTPR exposure.
But it is not technically reliable to assume “not QDMTT” automatically means “GloBE top-up is unchanged,” because a non-QDMTT domestic minimum tax may still be a Covered Tax (and therefore increase Adjusted Covered Taxes / ETR, reducing the GloBE top-up tax).
The double-layer risk is most acute in narrower fact patterns (e.g., the levy is not a Covered Tax for GloBE; base/timing differences mean it doesn’t raise ETR enough; or uncertainty/dispute mechanics prevent it from being treated as payable/included in the relevant way).
Because “QDMTT payable” matters, dispute outcomes and payment finality can affect both:
Facts (Jurisdiction A, FY2025)
Step 1 — GloBE top-up tax before Domestic Top-up Tax subtraction
Top-up Tax %:
Jurisdictional Top-up Tax (before subtracting Domestic Top-up Tax):
Step 2 — Apply Domestic Top-up Tax (QDMTT payable) in the Art. 5.2.3 formula
Assume Jurisdiction A has a QDMTT and the amount payable for FY2025 is 5.
Result
The risk with “not QDMTT” is often modeled too aggressively. Here are two common patterns:
Facts (Jurisdiction B, FY2025)
Illustrative impact
Outcome
So what’s the Pillar Two problem here?
Typically: loss of QDMTT safe harbour simplifications, additional reconciliation/uncertainty work, and a higher risk that local design choices create differences vs GloBE in other years or other profiles—rather than an automatic “double cash tax” equal to the full GloBE top-up.
Facts (Jurisdiction B, FY2025)
Illustrative combined burden (narrow-case illustration)
The practical takeaway is still that qualification analysis is not academic—but the “10” result is fact-pattern dependent and should not be used as the default assumption.
Facts (Jurisdiction C, FY2025)
Step 1 — Compute GloBE top-up tax
Step 2 — Assume domestic QDMTT payable is 4.0
If Jurisdiction C’s QDMTT computes 4.0 payable for FY2025:
Result
For most groups, QDMTT increases the number of jurisdictions where Pillar Two is “real” locally (filing, payment, controversy). The best compliance models minimize duplication.
Determine scope
Build jurisdiction-level Pillar Two data
Compute and file QDMTT locally
Compute residual GloBE (IIR/UTPR) and file the GIR
If you’re building compliance processes around the OECD GIR: the January 2025 GIR version incorporates clarifications on completing the return and reflects later OECD Administrative Guidance releases (including December 2023 and June 2024), so it’s worth aligning your reporting templates to that “post-guidance” shape.
Treat QDMTT as a first-class data product: build a single “Pillar Two dataset” that can serve (i) local QDMTT, (ii) parent-level IIR/UTPR, and (iii) GIR reporting—then map local deviations on top.
Teams that operationalize QDMTT with a single, controlled Pillar Two dataset typically reduce rework across local filings, parent computations, and GIR reporting—and they spot “not qualified / not payable” issues early enough to manage cash tax surprises.
QDMTT stands for Qualified Domestic Minimum Top-up Tax—a domestic tax intended to be treated as functionally equivalent to the OECD GloBE rules.
To collect the top-up tax locally (up to the 15% minimum) instead of allowing another jurisdiction to collect it under the IIR, with UTPR as the backstop.
Under the OECD Model Rules, the Jurisdictional Top-up Tax calculation (Art. 5.2.3) subtracts Domestic Top-up Tax, defined as the QDMTT payable for the year. This often reduces residual top-up tax for that jurisdiction to zero before IIR/UTPR applies.
It must be functionally equivalent to GloBE in both design (architecture) and outcomes, it must not be structured in a way that produces outcomes systematically lower than GloBE, and it must not provide benefits related to the GloBE rules (OECD Feb 2023 Agreed Administrative Guidance).
A mechanism under which an MNE may treat a jurisdiction’s GloBE top-up tax as deemed zero when that jurisdiction has a QDMTT meeting the safe harbour standards and the Filing Constituent Entity makes the election (OECD July 2023 Administrative Guidance).
No. Only a tax treated as QDMTT payable for the year (and “qualified” under the OECD framework) will generally reduce residual top-up tax via Art. 5.2.3. Also, a non-QDMTT domestic minimum tax may still affect GloBE results if it is included in Covered Taxes—so you need to model both the Art. 5.2.3 and Article 4.2 pathways.
No. In the GloBE computation, the Domestic Top-up Tax subtraction is effectively capped so the jurisdictional top-up tax does not go below zero (OECD Consolidated Commentary (2025) on Art. 5.2.3 mechanics).
If the amount is not treated as payable (e.g., under challenge or deemed not assessable/collectible), it can reduce the availability of the Domestic Top-up Tax subtraction and can also block reliance on the QDMTT safe harbour election (OECD July 2023 Guidance; OECD Consolidated Commentary (2025)).
Two useful references (for different purposes) are:
https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/multinational-top-up-tax-and-domestic-top-up-tax/mtt09970Centralize Pillar Two data (aligned to the UPE consolidation standard where feasible), compute local QDMTT and residual GloBE from the same dataset, and integrate GIR reporting controls using the OECD GloBE Information Return framework (OECD GIR, Jan 2025).