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Borys Ulanenko
CEO of ArmsLength AI
![TP Documentation for Business Restructurings [2025]: Exit Charges & FAR](/_next/image?url=%2Fimages%2Fblog%2Fdocumentation-for-restructurings%2Fdocumentation-for-restructurings.png&w=3840&q=75)
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Effective business restructuring documentation should comprehensively capture three phases: (1) the pre-restructuring state—functions, assets, risks, and profit allocation of each entity before the change; (2) the restructuring transaction itself—business rationale, compensation analysis for transferred value, and valuation methodology; and (3) the post-restructuring arrangements—new functional profiles, revised intercompany agreements, and arm's length pricing for ongoing transactions.
The OECD defines a business restructuring as the "cross-border reorganisation of the commercial or financial relations between associated enterprises, including the termination or substantial renegotiation of existing arrangements." When such restructurings involve a transfer of something of value—whether rights, assets, intangibles, or profit potential—arm's length compensation (often called an "exit charge" or "buy-in" in practice) may be required, depending on whether independent parties would demand payment in comparable circumstances. Documentation is your primary defense against aggressive audit adjustments in restructuring cases.
Important: OECD Chapter IX provides guidance on applying the arm's length principle to restructurings. Specific documentation obligations, filing deadlines, and penalty rules are set by local law and vary by jurisdiction.
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines Chapter IX provides the authoritative framework for restructuring analysis. For transfer pricing purposes, a business restructuring is defined as a cross-border reorganization of commercial or financial relations between associated enterprises—including terminating or substantially renegotiating existing arrangements.
Common restructuring scenarios include:
| Restructuring Type | Description |
|---|---|
| Distributor conversion | Full-fledged distributor becomes limited-risk distributor or commissionaire |
| Manufacturer conversion | Full-risk manufacturer becomes toll or contract manufacturer |
| IP centralization | Intangibles (patents, trademarks, know-how) transferred to a central principal |
| Shared services centralization | R&D, marketing, or administrative functions consolidated regionally |
| Business line divestiture | Closing or transferring operations to another group entity |
| Risk reallocation | Shifting key risks (inventory, credit, market) between related parties |
Critical Distinction: What matters is the economic substance of the change—not just the legal form. A pure legal reorganization under a new holding company, without changing commercial or financial relations, often falls outside Chapter IX. However, even a "legal-only" change could trigger analysis if it involves termination or novation of contracts that alter commercial relations. The key question: did the reorganization change who does what, who owns what, and who bears what risks?
In practice, many groups screen out changes that do not materially alter commercial or financial relations. However, the facts always matter—what appears routine may still require analysis if it shifts value. Common heuristics (not OECD carve-outs) for identifying non-restructuring changes include:
Chapter IX analysis becomes most contentious where a restructuring alters rights, assets, or risks—and therefore affects profit potential. Changes involving major intangible transfers, termination of valuable contractual rights, or substantial functional shifts warrant careful documentation.
Thorough documentation of the "before" state is the foundation of any defensible restructuring analysis. Without this baseline, it becomes impossible to demonstrate what value (if any) was transferred.
Document in detail each entity's:
OECD Emphasis: Actual conduct matters—not just contractual allocations. An unexercised contractual function is irrelevant if the party never performed it. Document what each entity actually did, not just what agreements say.
For intangibles, document beyond legal title:
| DEMPE Function | Documentation Required |
|---|---|
| Development | Who performed R&D? Staff headcount, R&D expenditure, facilities |
| Enhancement | Who improved existing IP? Ongoing innovation activities |
| Maintenance | Who maintained IP value? Quality control, updates |
| Protection | Who registered/defended IP? Legal costs, enforcement |
| Exploitation | Who commercialized IP? Sales, marketing, licensing activities |
In restructurings, DEMPE analysis helps determine what changed: who performed and controlled these functions pre- vs. post-restructuring, not merely "what value transferred." This before/after comparison is essential for identifying whether compensation is warranted.
Compile copies or summaries of:
OECD Chapter IX notes that written agreements (if reflective of actual conduct) are the starting point for transaction delineation. If actual practice diverged, document those facts as part of the pre-state.
Document how profits and losses were allocated among entities:
This illuminates each entity's profit potential prior to restructuring and provides the baseline for any exit charge calculation.
The commercial reasons for restructuring must be thoroughly documented—even though they are not strictly TP factors. This includes:
Critical Timing: The analysis is conducted ex ante—based on information available at the time of the restructuring decision. Expected benefits and options realistically available inform whether compensation would arise at arm's length. Document projections contemporaneously to avoid hindsight bias arguments.
Document what independent companies in similar situations could realistically do:
Evidence might include market reports, industry case studies, or comparable third-party transaction terms.
A key issue is whether the restructuring warrants arm's length compensation—sometimes called an "exit charge" or "buy-in" in practice (though OECD uses "compensation" or "indemnification" terminology).
The question is not automatic: OECD requires determining whether, at arm's length, the restructuring would give rise to compensation or indemnification. This depends on:
Key Nuance: OECD explicitly notes cases where independent parties may not require explicit compensation—for example, in some outsourcing scenarios where the restructured party expects sufficient benefits from the new arrangement. Compensation is not automatic whenever value shifts; it depends on the arm's length test.
Common triggers for compensation analysis:
| Trigger | Example |
|---|---|
| Transfer of functions | Sales functions moved from local distributor to regional hub |
| Transfer of assets | Manufacturing equipment relocated to low-cost jurisdiction |
| Transfer of risks | Inventory risk shifted from local entity to principal |
| Transfer of intangibles | Customer lists, patents, or know-how centralized |
| Termination of contracts | Distribution rights terminated without adequate compensation |
| Transfer of ongoing concern | Functioning business unit moved between jurisdictions |
A restructuring that shifts profit potential may warrant compensation if the restructured entity gives up valuable rights or assets, or assumes detriments that independents would price. Profit potential is only compensable when supported by underlying rights or assets—not simply foregone future profits.
An "exit charge" (practitioner terminology) is a one-time compensation for the loss of value due to the restructuring. It often reflects a "bundle" of transferred elements: intangible rights, customer relationships, and ongoing business value.
The principle: In many (though not all) cases, independent parties would not relinquish valuable rights or profit potential without adequate compensation. The exit charge should equal what the stripped entity would reasonably demand in an arm's length negotiation—considering both what it gives up and the benefits it receives under the new arrangement.
| Approach | Description | Reliability Considerations |
|---|---|---|
| Income Approach (DCF) | Project future profits/cash flows of transferred element, discount to present value | Often reliable for intangibles and ongoing concerns; highly sensitive to assumptions |
| Market Approach | Use comparable transaction prices (similar business sales, royalty rates) | Most reliable when comparable transactions exist |
| Cost Approach | Replacement cost or historical R&D spend plus margin | May be informative for tangibles or early-stage intangibles; less useful for unique profit potential |
OECD does not prescribe a hierarchy among these methods—the choice depends on reliability given the specific facts and availability of data. Document your selection rationale.
OECD Guidance: The total compensation for an ongoing concern transfer need not equal the sum of separate valuations of its parts—aggregate valuation of interrelated assets, risks, and functions may be necessary to reliably measure arm's length price. Document the methodology, assumptions, discount rates, and any expert reports.
A "buy-in" (practitioner terminology—sometimes confused with cost contribution arrangement buy-ins) refers to one-time compensation when a new entity takes over and uses existing intangibles or know-how. For example, if a new manufacturer assumes production using proprietary recipes or processes, it may make a buy-in payment for access to those intangibles.
Valuation follows the same principles: estimate future benefits from the intangible and set an arm's length one-time payment. The terminology varies across jurisdictions and practice areas—OECD uses "compensation" or "indemnification" framing.
After the restructuring, new intercompany terms apply and must be documented comprehensively.
Create a clear before/after comparison showing:
For example, if a distributor lost marketing duties and became a limited-risk agent, document the reduced functional profile and explain how this justifies the new (lower) remuneration.
Prepare or revise contracts reflecting the new business model:
| Transaction Type | Key Agreement Terms |
|---|---|
| Limited-risk distribution | Commission or fixed margin, no inventory risk |
| Contract manufacturing | Cost-plus pricing, principal owns materials |
| IP licensing | Royalty rates, territory, exclusive/non-exclusive |
| Service arrangements | Fee basis, service levels, cost allocation |
Ensure written contracts exist and reflect the new FAR profiles. The terms must specify pricing mechanisms that match the revised functional analysis.
Provide transfer pricing support demonstrating that new prices are arm's length given the changed profiles:
The OECD instructs that new remuneration must align with each party's remaining contributions and risk exposure.
Compare before-and-after profits for continuity:
If one entity's profit share dropped substantially, the documentation must clearly explain how reduced functions justify the new return level.
If the restructuring aimed at generating synergies (scale economies, location savings), confirm that benefits are shared appropriately:
When restructurings transfer value, accurate valuation is critical for defensibility.
Transferred fixed assets or inventory should be valued at arm's length market value:
Book value is usually insufficient unless it happens to equal fair market value.
Intangible and IP transfers are high-risk areas. OECD distinguishes several scenarios:
Transfer to Central Entity: When local intangibles (patents, contract rights, customer relationships) move to a principal, value based on expected future earnings from those intangibles. If valuation at transfer is uncertain, later adjustments may apply under the hard-to-value intangible (HTVI) regime—a specific set of rules, not applicable to all intangibles.
Limited-Risk Conversions: When a full-risk entity becomes limited-risk, it may surrender local know-how or contractual rights. Whether compensation is due—and how much—depends on whether the entity had compensable rights/assets and whether it is at least as well off under its realistic alternatives. In some cases (e.g., certain outsourcing arrangements), the restructured entity may expect sufficient benefits from the new structure that independents would not require explicit compensation.
Valuation Methods for Intangibles:
| Method | Description |
|---|---|
| Discounted Cash Flow | Project incremental cash flows from intangible, discount at appropriate WACC |
| Relief-from-Royalty | Value based on avoided royalty payments if licensed externally |
| Multi-Period Excess Earnings | Isolate earnings attributable to intangible after routine returns |
| Market Comparables | Compare royalty rates or transaction multiples for similar IP |
HTVI Warning: The HTVI regime applies to specific situations where valuation is highly uncertain at the time of transfer. If ex ante projections were reasonable and differences from outcomes are due to unforeseeable events, adjustments generally shouldn't be made. However, tax authorities may use ex post outcomes as presumptive evidence if projections were unreasonable. Document all valuation assumptions and their basis.
OECD recognizes "ongoing concern" transfers—essentially selling a functioning business unit. The valuation should reflect all valuable elements that would be remunerated between independent parties:
Workforce-in-Place: An assembled workforce is not usually treated as a separate intangible on its own under OECD guidance. However, it may significantly affect the valuation of a transferred business or ongoing concern—a trained team ready to operate increases business value even if it's not a standalone asset.
Common valuation approaches include DCF of expected future operating profits or cost-of-assembly analysis. The choice depends on reliability given the specific facts—neither method is universally "preferred."
"Location savings" are cost advantages from relocating activities to a lower-cost country. If a restructuring deliberately shifts functions to gain these savings:
The bottom line: where restructuring yields significant location savings, document either market evidence of how savings are shared or a reasonable allocation plan based on each entity's contribution.
Local market advantages refer to benefits from access to a specific market—such as brand recognition, distribution networks, customer relationships, or regulatory approvals. OECD distinguishes between:
If the restructuring causes one entity to lose rights needed to exploit local market advantages:
The distinction matters: a company may give up access to a favorable market without compensation if it never held transferable rights to that access—but if it held licenses, exclusive arrangements, or developed local marketing intangibles, those may warrant arm's length payment.
Tax authorities frequently challenge restructurings. Strengthen your defense with:
Pre-Restructure Preparation:
During-Restructure Execution:
Post-Restructure Maintenance:
Audit Red Flags: Tax authorities particularly scrutinize restructurings where: (1) exit charges are zero or nominal despite significant FAR changes, (2) the "stripped" entity continues performing similar functions, or (3) projections used in valuations prove wildly inaccurate without explanation. Address these proactively in documentation.
These are common audit pain points observed in restructuring cases—documentation gaps that frequently lead to disputes and adjustments.
Problem: Failing to record why the group restructured.
Consequence: Without clear commercial justification and alternatives considered, tax authorities may suspect tax-motivated restructuring.
Fix: Always prepare a rationale memo or board minutes explaining strategic reasons.
Problem: Neglecting to capture the "before" state—original FAR profiles, intangibles inventory, profit allocation.
Consequence: No baseline exists to assess value changes or justify exit charges.
Fix: Create detailed functional analysis and asset inventory before restructuring.
Problem: Moving functions or intangibles without analyzing whether arm's length compensation is warranted.
Consequence: If valuable rights/assets transfer without consideration of compensation, auditors will challenge.
Fix: Always conduct the arm's length test for compensation, even if the conclusion is that none is due. Document the analysis.
Problem: Setting an inappropriately low transfer price for IP or ongoing business.
Consequence: Tax authorities will impute higher royalties or exit charges.
Fix: Use robust valuation methodologies with supportable assumptions.
Problem: New contracts don't match the revised functional profiles.
Consequence: Paying high royalties to an entity that no longer creates intangibles invites adjustment.
Fix: Ensure each new pricing mechanism reflects the new FAR.
Problem: Relying on internal reassignments without signed intercompany agreements.
Consequence: Difficult to evaluate arm's length; terms may be imputed by authorities.
Fix: Document new terms in written, signed agreements.
Problem: Claiming an exit charge without a valuation report or justification.
Consequence: Ad hoc numbers will be ignored by tax administrations.
Fix: Prepare contemporaneous appraisals or DCF analysis with documented assumptions.
These examples are illustrative only. Actual margins, methods, and compensation will vary widely based on specific facts, industry, and jurisdiction.
Scenario: LocalDist sold products as a full-fledged distributor (marketing, warehousing, credit functions). It is restructured to a limited-risk distributor receiving only a fixed margin.
Pre-Restructuring Documentation:
Compensation Analysis:
Post-Restructuring Documentation:
Scenario: ProdCo in Country A manufactures and sells locally. It is restructured into a toll manufacturer for the Group, with machines transferred to ManuCo in Country B.
Pre-Restructuring Documentation:
Compensation Analysis:
Post-Restructuring Documentation:
Scenario: R&D subsidiary InnovCo owns valuable patents and conducts development. The group restructures to concentrate IP in PrincipalCo.
Pre-Restructuring Documentation:
Exit Charge (Buy-In) Calculation:
Post-Restructuring Documentation:
Documentation Guides:
Related Technical Guides:
Glossary:
For transfer pricing, a business restructuring is a cross-border reorganization of commercial or financial relations between associated enterprises—including termination or substantial renegotiation of existing arrangements. The OECD definition focuses on substantive change to commercial/financial relations: a pure legal reorganization that doesn't alter how entities transact generally falls outside Chapter IX, while shifting key manufacturing, distribution, or IP functions—or terminating/renegotiating material contracts—triggers analysis. The key question is whether the reorganization changed who does what, who owns what, and who bears what risks.
An exit charge (compensation) may be required when the restructuring involves a transfer of something of value—rights, assets, or profit potential supported by those rights/assets. The test is whether, at arm's length, the restructuring would give rise to compensation. Key factors include: (1) what rights/assets changed hands, (2) options realistically available to each party, and (3) whether the restructured entity is at least as well off as under realistic alternatives. Simply reorganizing without moving compensable value would not trigger payment. However, where an entity surrenders valuable contractual rights or intangibles, compensation is often warranted. OECD notes exceptions—in some outsourcing scenarios, the restructured party may expect sufficient benefits that independents would not require explicit compensation.
Exit charges are typically valued using standard methodologies: the income approach (discounted cash flow projecting future profits), the market approach (comparable transactions), or the cost approach (replacement cost). OECD does not prescribe a hierarchy—the choice depends on reliability given the specific facts. For intangibles and ongoing concerns, DCF is common in practice—project the incremental profits the transferred element would have generated, then discount to present value. Document the methodology, selection rationale, assumptions, discount rates, growth projections, and any expert valuations. Tax authorities will scrutinize whether the approach and inputs make sense for the specific transferred items.
Pre-restructuring documentation should include: (1) detailed functional analysis showing each entity's functions, assets, and risks; (2) intangibles inventory with DEMPE analysis; (3) existing intercompany agreements; (4) historical profit allocation and financial statements; (5) business rationale memo explaining strategic objectives and alternatives considered; and (6) board or management approval documents. This creates the baseline for assessing what value changed and whether compensation is warranted.
The most frequent mistakes are: (1) not documenting the business rationale—without commercial justification, tax authorities suspect tax motives; (2) inadequate pre-restructure FAR analysis—no baseline means no defense; (3) skipping exit charge analysis entirely; (4) undervaluing transferred intangibles; (5) post-restructure agreements that don't match the new functional profiles; (6) missing formal intercompany contracts; and (7) no valuation report or support for claimed compensation. Avoiding these requires contemporaneous, detailed documentation at each phase.
If restructuring relocates activities to a lower-cost country, first quantify the location savings (labor differentials, rent savings). Then determine how independent parties would share such savings—use local market comparables if available. If the low-cost affiliate merely executes orders (limited-risk), it typically shouldn't capture all savings; if it contributes significant functions, it may retain more. Document the allocation methodology and support it with either market evidence or a logical cost-sharing analysis tied to each party's contribution.
Without proper documentation, restructuring can trigger aggressive adjustments. Tax authorities may: impute income (impose compensation you didn't pay), recharacterize the transaction, or disallow claimed deductions. They can argue lack of arm's length consideration and adjust intercompany pricing accordingly. Penalties may apply if returns are deemed incorrect—the specifics depend on jurisdiction. In practice, maintaining appropriate documentation and using supportable valuation assumptions are key to defending restructuring positions. Without contemporaneous evidence of the rationale, FAR profiles, and arm's length analysis, disputes become significantly harder to win.
Post-restructuring agreements must reflect the new functional profiles and revised risk allocation. For example, if a full-fledged distributor becomes a limited-risk agent, the new agreement should specify: reduced scope of services, no inventory or credit risk, and fixed commission-based remuneration instead of variable margins. The pricing mechanisms must match the new FAR—continuing to pay high returns to an entity with reduced functions creates inconsistency that invites audit challenge. Always prepare new agreements that clearly document the changed relationship.